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ration of their discretion in the choice of 
penalty was limited or qualified in any way 
by some general introductory remarks spo-
ken 33 instructions earlier. 
Two separate juries have heard the evi-
dence and called for the extreme penalty in 
this case. We reversed before (66 Cal.2d 
524, 58 Cal.Rptr. 332, 426 P.2d 9(0) be-
cause of asserted prejudicial misconduct of 
the prosecutor. Now the majority seize 
upon one word in one instruction to re-
verse as to penalty a second time. The re-
sult is a heavy burden upon the expeditious 
administration of criminal justice. I am 
persuaded there is wholly inadequate justi-
fication under the "miscarriage of justice" 
clause of the Constitution (Cal.Canst., art. 
VI, § 13) to require yet another penalty 
trial. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
McCOMB and BURKE, JJ., concur. 
Rehearing denied; McCOMB, J., dis-
senting. 
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Thomas L. BLACKMON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Louis H. HALE at al., Defendants 
and Respondents. 
L. A. 29674. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Jan. 15, 1970. 
Action by client against his attorney, 
former members of attorney's finn who 
were cotrustees of finn trust account and 
bank in which· trust account was main-
tained to recover funds allegedly misappro-
priated by client's attorney. The Superior 
Court, Los Angeles County, Harold F. Col-
lins, J., rendered judgment in favor of cli-
ent and against client's attorney and ren-
dered judgment adverse to client with re-
spect to all other defendants. Client ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Traynor, C. 
J., held that although law finn's records 
indicated that first attorney and second at-
torney regarded client as a client of first 
attorney only, in view of lack of evidence 
that either of attorneys ever informed cli-
ent that first attorney was not representing 
the client as a member of firm, and in 
view of fact that the two attorneys held 
themselves out to public and to client as 
partners, second attorney, as a partner of 
first attorney, was liable for loss sustained 
by client when first attorney misappro-
priated funds entrusted to him by client. 
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part. 
Opinion, CaI.App., 78 Cal.Rptr. 569, 
vacated. 
I. Banks and BankIng *"130(3) 
Although cashier's check given by cli-
ent to attorney was made payable to order 
of trust account containing names of attor-
ney and his partner, and bank deposited 
check in trust account containing names of 
those two attorneys and a third partner, 
bank was not liable to client after attorney 
misappropriated check proceeds, where des-
tination of check was intended by both 
parties to be trust account used by attorney 
and by firm of attorney and second part-
ner for deposit of trust monies, and that 
account was trust account containing 
names of those two attorneys and third 
partner. West's Ann.Com.Code, §§ 3204-
3206. 
2. Banks and Banking *"130(3) 
Although either signature of one of 
law partners or signatures 0 f both second 
and third law_ partners were required to 
withdraw funds from law firm's trust ac-
count, absent evidence that stamped en-
dorsement was not authorized to effect a 
deposit in trust account, bank which relied 
on stamped endorsement in depositing 
check was not liable for loss sustained by 
client when one of law partners misappro-
priated check proceeds. 
3. Banks and Banking *"130(1) 
If a deposit is made in a bank to the 
credit of a person as trustee, the bank is 
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charged with notice that the funds are re- was acting solely in that capacity, partner-
ceived in a fiduciary capacity. ship of that attorney and another would 
4. Banks and Banking *"130(1) not be liable for losses sustained by client 
Bank is not liable for misappropriation when attorney misappropriated client's 
of trust funds by trustee unless the bank funds. West's Ann.Corp.Code, §§ 15009, 
has knowledge, actual or constructive, of 15014, 15015. 
such misappropriation. II. Partnership ~160 
5. Banks and Banking _133 A person dealing with a partnership 
Bank is authorized to honor withdraw- usually is in no position to know of special 
als from an account on signatures author- agreements between the partners, and thus 
ized by signature card, which serves as a cannot be charged with knowledge of such 
contract between depositors and the bank agreements absent specific notice. West's 
for handling of the afcount. Ann.Corp.Code, §§ 15009, 15014, 15015. 
6. Banks and BankIng *"130(1) 12. Attorney and Client _119 
So long as checks drawn on account In undertaking to clear title to realty 
are signed in conformity with signature and negotiate purchase of note and mort-
card, and absent any knowledge of a mis- gage on that property, attorney was prac-
appropriation, the bank is free from liabiB- tieing law, as affecting question whether 
ty for honoring a check drawn ill breach attorney's law partner was liable for losses 
of trust. sustained by client when attorney misap-
7. Banks and Banking *"130(1) 
Although bank deposited proceeds of 
cashier's check in a trust account with a 
name different from that of payee, that act 
did not as a matter of law put bank on no-
tice of a possible misappropriation, where 
parties intended that check be deposited in 
that account. 
8. Attorney and CUent *"119 
If attorney received client's money 
while acting within scope of his apparent 
authority or partnership received money in 
course of its business, attprney's partner 
was jointly and severally liable for losses 
sustained by client when attorney misap· 
propriated funds. West's Ann.Corp.Code, 
§§ 15009, 15014, 15015. 
9. Partnership *,,217(1) 
Ostensible agency or acts within scope 
of partnership business are presumed 
where business done by supposed agent, so 
far as open to observation of third parties, 
is consistent with existence of an agency, 
and where the third party was justified in 
believing that an agency existed. West's 
Ann.Corp.Code, §§ 15009, 15014, 15015. 
10. Attorney and CII.nt _119 
If attorney was acting only in his indi· 
vidual capacity and client knew that he 
propriated funds entrusted to him to make 
offer to purchase note and mortgage. 
13. Attorney and CUent *"119 
Although law firm's records indicated 
that first attorney and second attorney re-
garded client as a client of first attorney 
only, in view of lack of evidence that ei-
ther of attorneys ever informed client that 
first attorney was not representing the 
client as a member of firm, and in view of 
fact that the two attorneys held themselves 
out to public and to client as partners, sec-
ond attorney, as a partner of first attor-
ney, was liable for loss sustained by client 
when first attorney misappropriated funds 
entrusted to him by client. West's Ann. 
Corp.Code, § 15009. 
14. Trusts _240 
A trustee is not strictly liable for 
wrongful acts of cotrustee. 
I~. Trusts _240 
A trustee must exercise reasonable su-
pervision over conduct of a cotrustee in re-
lation to the trust. West's Ann.Civ.Code, 
§ 2239. 
16. Trusts *"240 
A trustee may render himself liable 
for losses resulting from misappropriation 
of funds by cotrustee by negligent inatten-
'. 
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tion to -his duties and by delinquency there. 
in far short of active participation in con~ 
version of funds. 
17. Trusts *"262 
A fiduciary who surrenders assets to 
exclusive possession or control of a cofidu-
ciary has an impressive burden of explana-
tion if he is to avoid liability for miscon-
duct on part of cofiduciary. 
lB. Altorney and Client _119 
Although first law pa~tner made some 
inquiry about money at time he signed 
check drawn on law firm's trust account 
and payable to order of account controlled 
by second partner, absent evidence of first 
partner's reason for making funds availa-
ble to second partner, first partner, as a 
£otrustee of funds deposited in trust ac-
count, was liable for loss sustained by cli-
ent as a result of second partner's misap-
propriation of funds. West's Ann.Civ. 
Code, § 2239. 
19. Trusts *,,2B9 
Trustees are under an obligation to 
render to beneficiaries a full account of all 
their dealings with the trust property, and 
where there has, been a negligent failure to 
keep true accounts all presumptions are 
against them upon a,settlement. 
20. Attorney and Client ¢:::3119 
Since law partner gave no explanation 
of disposition of client's money in law 
finn's' trust account during period when 
partner had full power to withdraw funds 
from the account, he failed to absolve him-
self of liability to client. 
21. Attorney and Client _119 
Attorney who withdrew from law firm 
and had his name deleted from firm name 
before client entrusted funds to a second 
attorney was not liable as a partner of sec-
ond attorney for loss sustained by client 
when second attorney misappropriated 
client's funds. West's Ann.Corp.Code, § 
15036. 
22. Attorney and Client ¢;ol19 
Attorney who had no knowledge of de-
posit of client's funds in law firm's trust 
account and did not participate with his 
two partners in withdrawal of money was 
not liable as a cotrustee, for loss sustained 
by client when one of his partners misap-
propriated funds. West's Ann.Civ.Code, § 
2239. 
Max Fink and Victor Shrtman, Beverly 
Hills, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Matthew L. Hatfield, Lancaster, Robert 
H. Fabian, Harris B. Taylor, Peter J. De-
mos, Swanwick, Donnelly & Proudfit, 
Donald O. Welton anf! Michael M. Gless, 
Los Angeles, for defendants and respond-
ents. 
TRAYNOR, Justice. 
Plaintiff Blackmon appeals from a judg-
ment in favor of defendants Hale, Lee, 
United California Bank, and Bank of 
America entered in an action to recover 
$23,500 plus interest. He sought to recover 
this sum from defendants on the ground 
that each of them was liable for the failure 
of defendant Adams to repay plaintiff 
$23,500 that plaintiff entrusted to Adams. 
A. default judgment against Adams is not 
involved in this appeal. 
In July 1961 James C. Adams, an attor-
ney, undertook to represent plaintiff in the 
latter's proposed purchase of a note and 
mortgage on real property in Nevada, 
owned by H. H. Records. Plaintiff went to 
Adams at the suggestion of Records. At 
that time Adams practiced law in Lancas-
ter in partnership with defendant Hale un-
der the name of Adams and Hale. The 
two attorneys had been partners since 1952. 
From November 1958 to May 1961 they 
had a third partner, defendant Lee, and 
during that period the three practiced law 
under the name of Adams, Hale, and Lee. 
On May 31, 1961, Lee withdrew from the 
firm. Adams and Hale continued the 
practice under the name Adams and Hale 
until they dissolved the firm on August 31, 
1961. 
About the middle of July 1961 Adams 
told plaintiff that funds would be needed 
to make an offer for the Nevada note and 
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mortgage. Plainti ff testified that he told J. C. Adams Trust Account. . Over the next 
Adams that he would put up the money, four months he diverted this money to his 
but he wanted the money placed in a trust own use. 
account so that it would be available when 
needed. If the offer was not accepted, the 
money was to be returned. Adams in-
structed plaintiff to make a check payable 
to Adams and Hale Trust Account and 
said "in this manner that he could offer 
this money to these people and it would be 
available." On August 17" plaintiff pur-
chased a cashier's check for $24,500 from 
the Bank of America, payable to the order 
of Adams and Hale Trust Account and 
mailed the check to Adams. On August 18 
Adams endorsed the check "Adams and 
Hale Trust Account by J. C. Adams." Be-
low that endorsement was rubber stamped 
"Pay to the order of California Bank; Ad-
ams, Hale and Lee Trust Account." The 
check was deposited in the Adams, Hale, 
and Lee Trust Account at the California 
Bank in Lancaster. 
During the existence of the Adams, 
Hale, and Lee partnership the firm main-
tained a trust account at the California 
Bank, which later became the United Cali-
fornia Bank, in the name of Adams, Hale, 
and Lee Trust Account. Withdrawals 
from the account were authorized on the 
signature of Hale alone or on the joint sig-
natures of Adams and Lee. After Lee left 
the firm on May 31, Adams and Hale con-
tinued to use the same account under the 
same name for the deposit of trust moneys 
and did not open a separate trust account 
under the name of Adams and Hale. Be-
fore 1958 they had a trust account in the 
name of Adams and Hale at the same 
branch of the California Bank, but for sev· 
eral years that account had been tithe1 
dormant or closed. 
On August 31 Adams and Hale dissolved 
their partnership. On September 6 Adams 
asked Hale to sigu a check for $21,386 
drawn on the Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust 
Account and payable to the J. C. Adams 
Trust Account. Hale signed the check and 
de1iv'ered it to Adams. Adams used the 
check to open a new account at the Securi-
ty First National Bank under the name of 
Apparently plaintiff's proposed, Pllrchas~ 
of the note and mortgage was never car-
ried out, and in due course plaintiff de~ 
manded the return of his $24,500. In 
April 1962 Adams paid plaintiff $1,000, 
leaving a balance due of $23,500. 
The Banks' ·Liabaily .. 
[1] Plaintiff seeks to hold the banks 
liable on three theories. He first contends 
that the cashier'S check for $24,500 could 
lawfully be deposited only in the Adams 
and Hale Trust Account. Since the check 
was made payable in that name, he urges 
that the California Bank is liable to him 
for depositing the check in the Adams, 
Hale, and Lee Trust Accourit and that the 
Bank of America is liable to him for pay-
ing the check on the endorsement of the 
Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust Account .. _, . 
Plaintiff analogizes the desiguation of 
the Adams and Hale Trust Account as the 
payee to a restrictive endorsement that 
precludes the endorsee from negotiating 
the instrument contrary to the restriction. 
(See Civ.Code, § 3117; superseded by 
Com.Code, §§ 3204-3206.) The check, 
however, was credited to the precise ac-
count for which it was intended at the time 
it was drawn. Plaintiff testified that he 
wanted the money deposited in ~ trust ac-
count where it _ would be available when 
needed. No specific ~ccount 'was desig-
nated until Adams instructed plaintiff to 
make the check payable to the Adams and 
Hale Trust Account. The destination of the 
check was intend~d by both parties, how-
ever, to be the trust account used' by Ad-
ams and by the firm of Adams and Hale 
for the deposit of trust moneyS. That 
trust account was the Adams, Hale, and 
Lee Trust Account. The incompleteness 
and irregularity of the name of the payee 
was inconsequential, for the check rea!=hed 
its intended destination. Plaintiff was not 
injured by the deposit of the funds in the 
Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust Account in:-
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stead of the Adams and Hale Trust Ac-
count. 
[2] Plaintiff next contends that the 
banks are liable for payment of the check 
on an ineffective endorsement. He urges 
that the signatures of both Adams and 
Hale Wefe required. The check was en-
dorsed Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust Ac-
count, the account for which the money 
was intended. It was also endorsed Adams 
and Hale Trust Account, by]. C. Adams. 
Although either Hale's signature or the 
signatures of both Adams and Lee wefe 
required to withdraw funds from the Ad-
ams, Hale, and Lee Trust Account, there is 
no evidence that the stamped endorsement 
was not authorized to effect a deposit in 
the trust account. The banks are not liable 
for carrying out the intention of plaintiff 
and Adams by relying on the stamped en-
dorsement in depositing the check.1 
Plaintiff finally contends that the Cali-
fornia Bank had constructive notice of a 
possible misappropriation of trust funds 
when the proceeds of the cashier's check 
were deposited in an account with a name 
different from that of the payee, and that 
therefore the bank should have required 
the signatures of all the trustees of the 
Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust Account be. 
fore allowing withdrawal of money from 
that account. 
[3-7] If a deposit is made in a bank to 
the credit of a person as trustee, the bank 
is charged with notice that the funds are 
received in a fiduciary capacity. (United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. First 
Nat. Bank (1912) 18 Cal.App. 437, 440, 123 
P. 352; Keeney v. Bank of Italy (1917) 33 
Cal.App. 515, 51S-519, 165 P. 735.) The 
bank is not liable for the misappropriation 
of trust funds by the trustee, however, un-
less the bank has knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of such misappropr1atIon. 
(Lynch v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union 
Trust Co. (\931) 114 Cal.App. 565, 572-
I. Plaintiff objects to the trial court's find-
ing that the cashier's check was a bearer 
instrument that needed no endorsement. 
Since we have determined that the check 
573, 300 P. 74; Southern Trust & Com-
merce Bank v. San Diego Savings Bank 
(1922) 60 Cal.App. 215, 219, 212 P. 385.) 
Since the bank properly deposited plain-
tiff's money in the Adams, Hale and Lee 
Trust Account, that act did not as a matter 
of law put the bank on notice of a possible 
misappropriation. The record reveals no 
other fact that would give the requisite no-
tice. The bank is authorized to honor 
withdrawals from an account on the signa-
tures authorized by the signature card, 
which serves as a contract between the de-
positor and the bank for the handling of 
the account. So long as the checks drawn 
on the account are signed in conformity 
with the signature card, and absent any 
knowledge of a misappropriation, the bank 
is free from liability for honoring a check 
drawn in breach of trust. (Fin. Code, §§ 
952, 953; Desert Bermuda Properties v. 
Union Bank (1969) 265 Cal.App.2d 146, 
150-153, 71 Ca1.Rptr. 93.) 
The trial court correctly concluded that 
plaintiff failed to establish any basis for 
imposing liability on either of defendant 
banks. 
Hale's Liability 
At the time Adams recei ved the cashier's 
check for $24,500 payable to the Adams 
and Hale Trust Account he was practicing 
law in partnership with defendant Hale. 
Adams deposited the check in the firm's 
trust account, and thereafter secured $21,-
386 from that account by means of a check 
signed by Hale. Hale's liability for Adams' 
misappropriation of plaintiff's money must 
be determined in the context of the two ca-
pacities in which Hale acted, namely, as a 
partner of Adams and as a cotrustee of the 
funds deposited in the trust account. 
[8] Hales liability as a partner is gov-
erned by th~ Uniform Partnership Act. 
(Corp.Code, §§ 15001-15045.) Corporation 
Code, section 15014 provides that "The 
was properly endorsed, we need not de-
cide whether it was a bearer or an Ol-
der instrument. 
BLAOKMON v. HALE 
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partnership is bound to make good the 
loss: (a) Where one partner acting within 
the scope of his apparent authority re-
ceives money or property of a third person 
and misapplies it; and (b) Where the 
partnership in the course of its business re-
ceives money or property of a third person 
and the money or property so received is 
misapplied by any partner while it is in the 
custody of the partnership." Section 15015 
provides ,that each partner is jointly ,and 
severally liable for everything chargeable 
to the partnership under section 15014. 
Accordingly, if Adams received plaintiff's 
money while acting within the scope of his 
apparent authority or the partnership re-
ceived the money in the course of its busi-
ness, Hale is jointly and severally liable for 
plaintiff's losses. 
[9] "Every partner is an agent of the 
partnership for the purpose of its business, 
and the act of every partner * * * for 
apparently carrying on in the usual way 
the business of the partnership of which he 
is a member binds the partnership." 
(Corp.Code, § 15009.) The apparent scope 
of the partnership business depends pri-
marily on the conduct of the partnership 
and its partners and what they cause third 
persons to believe about the authority of 
the partners. Ostensible agency or acts 
- within the scope of- the partnership busi-
ness are presumed "where the business 
done by the supposed agent, so far as open 
to the observation of third parties, is con-
sistent with the existence of an agency, 
and wher~, as to the transaction in ques-
tion, the third party was justified in be-
lieving that an agency existed." (County 
First N at'l Bank of Santa Cruz v. Coast 
Dairies & Land Co. (1941) 46 Cal.App2d 
355, 366, 115 P.2d 988, 994; Kamen & Co. 
2. Corporations Code, section 15009 pro~ 
vides, in part: "(1) Every partner is an 
agent of the partnership fOr the purpose 
of its business, and the act of every part-
ner, including the -execution in the part-
nership name of any instrument, for ap-
parently carrying on in the usual way the 
business of the partnership of which he 
is a member binds the partnership, un-
less the partner 80 acting has in fact no 
v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co. (9th Cir. 1967) 
382 F.2d 689, 695.) The partnership will 
be relieved from liability for the wrongs of 
its partners acting individually when the 
third person has knowledge of the fact that 
he is dealing with the partner in his indi-
vidual capacity. (Corp.Code, § 15009.) • 
[10,11] In the present case if Adams 
was acting only in his individual capacity 
and plaintiff knew that he was acting sole-
ly in that capacity, the partnership of Ad-
ams and Hale and Hale are not liable. 
Sound public policy dictates that a partner-
ship must inform those who deal with its 
members in the course of the partnership's 
business of any special restrictions on a 
particular partner's authority. A person 
dealing with a partnership usually is in no 
position to know of special agreements be-
tween the partners, and thus cannot be 
charged with knowledge of such agree-
ments absent specific notice. (Williams v. 
More (1883) 63 Cal. 50, 51.) 
[12] Adams and Hale practiced law in 
partnership under the name of Adams and 
Hale, Attorneys at Law. The firm did not 
conduct any business other than the prac-
tice of law. Plaintiff employed Adams to 
clear title to certain real property in Ne-
vada and negotiate the purchase of the 
note and mortgage on that property. Ad-
ams was entrusted with $24,500 needed to 
make an offer to purchase the note and 
mortgage. In undertaking such responsi-
bilities Adams was practicing law. (See 
State Bar of California v. Superior Court 
(1929) 207 Cal. 323, 334-335, 278 P. 432; 
Nellis v. Massey (1952) 108 Cal.App.2d 
724, 728, 239 P.2d 509.) 
[13] Although the firm's records indi-
cate that Adams and Hale regarded plain-
authority to act for the partnership in 
the particular matter, and the person 
with whom he is dealing has knowledge 
of the fact thnt he has no such au-
thority. * * * ,(4) No act of 8 
partner in contravention of a restriction 
on authority shall bind the partnership 
to persons having knowledge of the re-
striction." 
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tiff as a client of Adams only, there is no 
evidence whatever that either Adams or 
Hale ever informed plaintiff that Adams 
was not representing plaintiff as a member 
of the firm. Moreover, Adams and Hale 
held themselves out to the public and to 
plaintiff as partners. The partnership dis-
played a sign viewable from the street 
reading "Adams and Hale, Attorneys at 
Law." Such signs are commonly used by 
law firms to indicate a partnership. (See 
Fletcher v. Pullen (1889) 70 Md. 205, 213, 
16 A. 887, 888.) Plaintiff testified that he 
knew that the firm was called Adams and 
Hale and that he dealt with Adams in the 
firm's offices. Furthermore, Adams in-
structed plaintiff to make his check pay-
able to the Adams and Hale Trust Ac-
count. In the absence of other evidence 
these facts would justify a reasonable man 
in believing that he was dealing with a 
partnership. (See Bedell v. Morris (1923) 
63 Cal.App. 453, 455-456, 218 P. 769; 
Crabbe v. Mires (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 456, 
459, 246 P .2d 991.) 
Hale contends, however, that plaintiff's 
own testimony supports the conclusion that 
plaintiff did not deal with Adams as a 
partner in the firm. Plaintiff testified as 
follows: 
"THE COURT: Were you a client of 
the law firm of Adams and Hale at that 
time [at the time plaintiff first met Ad-
am's] ? 
"THE WITNESS: No, sir. 
"THE COURT: Had you been at any 
time within the year 1961 a law client? 
"THE WITNESS: No sir. 
"THE COURT: Were you at any time 
thereafter a law client? 
"THE WITNESS: No, sir. 
"THE COURT: Of either Adams, Hale 
or Lee? 
"THE WITNESS: No, sir." 
3. It is immaterial in this ease that the 
actual misappropriation occurred nfter the 
partnership of Adams and Hale was dis-
solved. Until plaintiff had notice of the 
This testimony is inconclusive on the is~ 
sue whether plaintiff knew he was dealing 
only with Adams individually. At most it 
reflects lay confusion and uncertainty as to 
what constitutes an attorney~client rela-
tionship. It does not show that plaintiff 
had any awareness of partnership law, let 
alone that he meant his transaction to be 
kept separate from other partnership busi-
ness. It is therefore insufficient to estab-
lish that Adams did not act within the 
scope of hi's apparent authority.3 
The trial court also erred in. concluding 
that Hale was not liable in his capacity of 
cotrustee of plaintiff's money deposited in 
the Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust Account. 
The account established by the firm of Ad-
ams, Hale, and Lee in compliance with rule' 
9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the State Bar (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6076) 
was a voluntary trust (Civ.Code, § 2216; 
see also Hathaway v. Patterson (1873) 45 
Cal. 294, 300; 26 A.L.R.2d 1340, 1342; 7 
c.J.S. Attorney and Client § 139, pp. 976--
977 and cases cited in note 26), and the 
members of the firm became voluntary 
trustees of money thereafter placed in that 
account. 
[14-16] Any action taken by the part-
ners with respect to the money in the ac-
count must be considered in the light of 
their duties and responsibilities as trustees. 
(See 26 A.L.R.2d 1340, 1342.) A trustee is 
not strictly liable for the wrongful acts of 
a cotrustee. "A trustee is responsible for 
the wrongful acts of a co-trustee to which 
he consented, or which, by his negligence, 
he enabled the latter to commit, but for no 
others." (Civ.Code, § 2239.) A trustee 
must exercise reasonable supervision over 
the conduct of a cotrustee in relation to 
the trust. (Bermingham v. Wilcox (1898) 
120 Cal. 467, 471-473, 52 P. 822.) He may 
render himself liable "by negligent inatten-
tion to his duties, by delinquency therein 
far short of active participation in the con-
dissolution and consented to a discharge 
of the partnership, Hale remained liable 
for obligations assumed before dissolu-
tion. (Corp.Code, § 15036.) 
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version of trust funds by a coguardian." money to Adams. Accordingly, Lee is not 
(Estate of Whitney (1932) 124 Cal.App. liable as a partner of Adams for the loss of 
109, 118, 11 P.2d 1107, 1111; see also, Fox plaintiff's money. (Corp.Code, § 15036.) 
v. Tay (1891) 89 Cal. 339, 348-349, 24 P. 
855, 26 P. 897; Gaver v. Early (1923) 191 
Cal. 123, 126-127,215 P. 394.) 
[17,18] Hale signed a check drawn on 
the trust account for $21,386 payable to the 
order of J. C. Adams Trust Account. Al-
though Hale made some inquiry about the 
money at the time of the transfer, ther~ is 
no evidence of his reason for making the 
funds available to Adams; nor was plain-
tiff consulted before the transfer. Adams 
could not obtain possession of the money 
without the acquiescence of Hale or Lee. 
U[A] fiduciary who thus surrenders assets 
to the exclusive possession or control of a 
cofiduciary has an impressive burden of 
explanation if he is to avoid liability for 
misconduct on the part of the cofiduciary." 
(65 A.L.R.2d 1019, 1092-1093.) Hale has 
not met this burden. 
[19,20] Apart from the loss of $21,386 
misappropriated by Adams, $2,114 of the 
$24,SOO that plaintiff transferred to Adams 
remains unaccounted for. "Trustees are 
* * * under an obligation to render to 
beneficiaries a full account of all their 
dealings with the trust property. and where 
there has been a negligent failure to keep 
true accounts all presumptions are against 
them upon a settlement." (Estate of Mc-
Cabe (1950) 98 Ca1.App.2d S03, 50S, 220 P. 
2d 614, 616; see also, Purdy v. Johnson 
(1917) 174 Cal. 521, S27, 163 P. 893.) 
Since Hale gave no explanation of the dis-
position of the remaining $2,114 of plain-
tiff's money during the period when Hale 
had full power to withdraw funds from the 
trust account, he failed to absolve himself 
of liability to plaintiff for that amount. 
Lee's Liability 
[21] Lee withdrew from the law firm 
of Adams. Hale, and Lee and his name 
was deleted from the firm name on May 
31, 1961, before plaintiff entrusted his 
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[22] "Lee, however, was also a cotrustee 
of the Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust Ac-
count, and remained liable for any acts of 
his cotrustee that his negligence enabled 
the cotrustee to commit. (Civ.Code, § 
2239.) Lee, however, had no knowledge 
of the deposit and did not participate with 
Hale or Adams in the withdrawal of the 
money. Accordingly, no negligent acts or 
omissions of Lee enabled Adams to misap-
propriate $21,386 of plaintiff's money. 
Lee, like Hale, however, was under a 
duty to account for the $2,114 that Hale 
did not tum over to Adams (Estate of 
McCabe, supra, 98 CaI.App.2d at p. 50S, 
220 P.2d 614). Lee has not discharged 
that duty. Although he left the partner-
ship on May 31, 1961, the trust account 
was not closed until February 2, 1962. 
Furthermore, Lee testified that until Janu-
ary 23, 1%2, when he withdrew $84S.79 
from the trust account, he realized that he 
uwas one of the named persons on the ac-
count at the u.c.B. designated as the Ad-
ams, Hale and Lee Trust Account." On 
retrial Lee may be able to account for the 
disposition of the balance of plaintiff's 
money and show that, as in the case of the 
$21,386 that Hale delivered to Adams, he 
was in no way responsible for the loss. In 
the absence of such an accounting, how-
ever, Lee has not absolved himself of lia-
bility for the unaccounted-for balance. 
The part of the judgment in favor of de-
fendant banks is affirmed. The part of 
the judgment in favor of defendants Hale 
and Lee is reversed. Defendant banks 
shall recover their costs on appeal from 
plaintiff. Plaintiff shall recover from de-
fendants Hale and Lee his costs on the ap-
peal from the part of the judgment in their 
favor. 
McCOMB, PETERS, TOBRINER, 
MOSK, BURKE and SULLIVAN, JJ., 
concur. 
